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The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, Class Actions and 
the Patient’s Bill of Rights 
by 
Richard A. Epstein* and Alan O. Sykes** 
 
The purpose of this paper is to offer an evaluation of recent legal 
initiatives targeting managed care organizations (MCOs) for their allegedly 
deficient supply of health care to their consumers.  These MCOs--which tend to 
inject the provider of health care coverage into decisions over the type and 
amount of health care services provided--have grown in number, size and 
market penetration since the 1980s.  Speaking in the round, the best explanation 
for their success is that they have responded to the serious shortfalls in the earlier 
private regimes for delivery of health care insurance, namely, the use of 
indemnity insurance contracts that required the insurer to reimburse the 
designated health care provider on a fee-for-service basis.  That arrangement 
created strong incentives for the formation of a physician/patient alliance to 
increase the level of health care consumed above and beyond levels that would 
be regarded as cost-justified in the absence of a third party provider.  It is far 
easier to demand services, which at the time of delivery are paid for by others, 
rather than by one’s self.1   
The rise of the MCO responded to these structural weaknesses of the 
indemnity insurance model. The efficiency gains came not from substituting a 
flawless alternative to fee-for-service, but from substituting smaller contracting 
problems for larger ones.  And the market penetration of the MCO suggests that 
its organizational structure is better tailored to the control of risk, to the 
introduction of new technology, and to the management of a patient base than 
the prior alternatives. 
Yet so long as MCOs assume the care of millions of people, the law of 
large numbers warns us to expect legal disputes between patients and their 
MCO.  Medical services are difficult to monitor and on specified occasions may 
easily go astray.  Bad outcomes could be attributable to hopeless medical 
situations, to callous indifference of health care providers, or to a simple want of 
                                                 
*  James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. 
**  Frank and Bernice Greenberg Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.  We thank 
Robert Alt for excellent research assistance. 
1 For a basic account of the problem, see Patricia Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for 
Managed Care?  26 J. Legal Stud. 491 (1997); Richard A. Epstein, Managed Care Under Siege, 24 J. 
Medicine & Phil. 434 (1999). 
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ordinary care under the circumstances. In this environment, the greater control 
over patient care exerted by MCOs has invited greater assaults on the activities 
of MCOs.  The modern attack on them takes place along two key dimensions.  
First, in the most conspicuous recent developments, injured plaintiffs have 
to come rely on theories of vicarious liability and negligence to reach not only the 
hospital or physicians group that employs the individual physician, but also the 
MCO responsible for the selection, management and payment for medical 
services delivered by physicians and hospital groups.  These individual lawsuits 
brought against these MCOs fall into two broad categories.  The first category 
involves claims for personal injuries that arise out of the delivery of medical 
services.  In these suits, the plaintiff alleges that his condition was brought about 
by, or worsened by, the MCO’s decision, often made on cost grounds, to deny or 
limit some treatment that the treating physician had recommended for the 
patient.  Sometimes, these suits allege negligence on the part of both the 
individual physician and the MCO that oversaw its action.  At other times, the 
allegations of negligence are directed solely to the physician in question.  The 
MCO is joined as a defendant either on the ground that it held out the physician 
as its employee or exerted sufficient control over his activities so as to treat the 
physician not an independent contractor, but as an employee.2  These suits are 
brought under state law, where the plaintiffs assert that the defendants are not 
entitled to refuge under the so-called ERISA preemption doctrine that otherwise 
prevents medical malpractice actions from being brought against the 
administrators of medical health plans. 
Side-by-side with the expanded set of malpractice and coverage actions 
against MCOs is a fresh onslaught of class actions.  Typically, these suits do not 
allege any medical malpractice toward class members.  Rather, they seek to 
attack as a business and financial matter the entire range of practices that MCOs 
institute in order to control the cost of care in medical cases.  As is the habit 
today, these suits are not only based on common law theories of breach of 
contract, fraud and nondisclosure, but they also escalate the struggle by 
including counts that might allow punitive damages and attorney’s fees—counts 
that allege racketeering under both RICO (the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations3 and ERISA (the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act)4.  
The filing of these lawsuits is often accompanied by an extensive publicity and 
public relations campaign, much of which is directed to the stock analysts.  As 
was the case with the tobacco litigation, the purpose of these suits may be not so 
                                                 
2 For a recent illustration involving both theories, see Petrovich v. Share Health Plan. Inc. 
719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1999). 
3 18 U.S.C. §§1961-68. 
4 29 U.S.C. §1001 et. seq. 
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much to win a jury verdict, but to inflict sufficient interim reputational damages 
so as to create the climate for an industry-wide settlement that both alters 
standard medical practice, and places a tidy sum of wealth in the hands of the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers who initiated the suit.   
This paper intends to evaluate these two legal movements.  In order to do 
so it is necessary to state the benchmark against which this evaluation will take 
place.  Here our basic position is that most of the maneuvers involved in these 
attacks on managed care are inconsistent with the basic legal theories that define 
(a) the contract/tort boundary, (b) the principles of vicarious liability and (c) the 
proper role of class action as a procedural device to amalgamate individual 
claims that would otherwise not be brought.  The first part of that analysis begins 
with the proposition that the undisputed place for the law of torts is in the 
prevention of harms that one person (or organization) inflicts on strangers—that 
is those persons with whom it has no ongoing business relationships, or any 
convenient opportunity of establishing one prior to some harmful encounter.  
Typical illustrations of this relationship is the hunter whose stray bullet kills or 
injures an innocent bystander, the railroad whose sparks destroy a nearby 
farmhouse, or the factory whose pollution causes widespread physical damage 
to streams and the fish that swim in them.  In these cases, the unregulated actor 
is able to internalize all of the gain, but is forced to bear only part of the loss 
associated with its activity.  The upshot is that these actors will on average 
engage in too much risky activity.  Only if forced to bear the losses inflicted on 
others will they monitor activities that they undertake and the care used in 
undertaking them. 
The principles of tort law have another component that deals with the role 
of the plaintiff.  In the ordinary stranger case, the plaintiff’s own action 
sometimes helps to bring about the harm, at which point a defense of 
contributory negligence could allow the defendant to bar or reduce the recovery 
in question.  In non-stranger cases, the potential plaintiff, having a prior 
relationship with the potential defendant, may wish to anticipate the possibility 
of harm and enter into some kind of advance agreement that allocates the risk of 
loss before it occurs. To be useful, such agreements must have the capacity to 
override the legal default rules that would otherwise apply.  But the dominant 
legal position today often tends to disfavor or disallow these deviations.5  
On our view of the world, however, the entire area of medical services 
should be understood as involving a network of contracts and should not 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).  The 
literature on this issue is enormous.  See generally, Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Can the 
Private Sector Find Relief?, 49 Law & Contemp. Problems, 1 (1986).   
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unthinkingly invoke the norms of tort law in stranger cases.6 The key inquiry is 
whether something in the process of contract formation, or in the structure of the 
health care industry, precludes the use of the standard market principle that 
binds parties, regardless of personal status or social station, by agreement.  Our 
position cuts against the received wisdom, and much of the difficulty that we 
have with the recent attacks on managed care stems from the refusal of courts 
and legislators to allow contract to dominate tort rather than the other way 
around.    
Part I of this paper looks at the individual lawsuits against MCOs with 
reference to the principles of vicarious liability and to the question of what, if 
anything, displaces the primacy of contract in this area.  Part II then extends the 
analysis to the special wrinkles introduced by class actions. 
 
I.  The Liability of Managed Care Organizations 
 In this section, we lay out the existing law governing the liability MCOs, 
and examine certain prominent proposals to expand its scope.  We then discuss 
the wisdom of the current law and the proposed alternatives for policing 
managed care. 
A.  The Legal Landscape 
 Although individual arrangements may vary, MCOs usually contract with 
employers and occasionally individuals to provide a bundle of health care 
services for a predetermined fee.  In some instances, the MCOs employ salaried 
health care professionals to deliver these services.  In other instances, health care 
services are delivered through a network of independent contractors (such as the 
typical preferred provider network).7   
 Two principal types of disputes arise between MCOs and the patients 
covered by them.  First, patients may complain that their physicians have made 
errors in their treatment -- conventional claims of malpractice.  Second, patients 
may complain that their MCO has denied coverage that it is contractually bound 
to provide.  Although complaints about malpractice and improper denial of 
coverage are conceptually distinct, in practice they sometimes blend together.  
The refusal of an MCO to provide an expensive treatment that might have 
                                                 
6 For the early defense of this position, see Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for 
Contract, [1976] Am. Bar Found. J. 87; see also, Patricia Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, 
Evidence, and Public Policy (1985); Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care Choices: Private Contracts 
as Instruments of Health Reform (1995). 
7  See, e.g., Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756, 763-64 (Ill. 1999) 
(citing 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 125/1-2(7) (LEXIS through Public Act 91-712) (defining “Independent 
Practice Association” Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) as “financing entities that 
arrange and pay for health care by contracting with independent medical groups and 
practitioners.”)). 
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improved the patient’s outcome, for example, may be characterized as a failure 
of its physicians to live up to the industry standard of care (malpractice), or as an 
erroneous refusal to provide proper coverage, perhaps on grounds that the 
treatment was not “medically necessary” or was “experimental.”8  The legal 
remedies available to patients in these disputes involve a complex amalgam of 
state and federal law.   
1.  MCO Liability for Physician Malpractice 
   Lawsuits against physicians alleging medical malpractice are governed 
by state tort law.  The plaintiff must show that the physician was “negligent”— 
usually, a failure of the physician to provide the treatment that a reasonable 
practitioner with comparable medical training would have provided under the 
circumstances.9  Successful plaintiffs can recover the standard array of damages 
in personal injury cases, including medical expenses, lost wages, damages for 
loss of consortium, damages for pain and suffering, and statutory wrongful 
death damages.  In egregious cases, punitive damages may be recovered, 
although punitive awards are rare in medical malpractice actions.10  
 If a physician who is found liable for medical malpractice is a salaried 
employee of a hospital or medical center, the doctrine of respondeat superior 
allows the plaintiff to obtain a judgment against the employer as well.  Such 
liability is often termed “vicarious liability.”  Even if the physician is an 
independent contractor, the associated hospital or medical center may be 
vicariously liable for the physician if an argument can be made that the hospital 
misled the public into believing that the physician was its employee.11  The 
                                                 
 8 See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 2155 (2000) (noting that all the petitioner’s 
allegations target medical necessity determinations). 
9 Minnesota’s Jury Instruction Guide provides a typical example of this standard: “a doctor 
must use that degree of skill and learning which is normally possessed and used by doctors in 
good standing in a similar practice in similar communities and under like circumstances.” 4 
Minnesota District Judges Association Committee on Jury Instruction Guides, Minnesota Practice 
§ 425 G-S (2d ed. 1974), approved in Kalsbeck v. Westview Clinic, P.A., 375 N.W.2d 861, 868 
(Minn. App. 1985). 
10 In a survey of Cook County, for example, there was only one punitive damage award for 
medical malpractice from 1960 – 1984.  See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About 
the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1147, 1256 (1992) 
(citing Mark A. Peterson, et al., Punitive Damages, Empirical Findings 13 (1987)).  See also, 
Theodore Eisenberg, et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. Legal Stud. 623, 637 
(1997): “[P]unitive damages are most frequently awarded in the areas of law where breach of a 
legal duty suggests intentional or morally flawed behavior. In traditional tort areas where 
morally culpable conduct is not necessarily involved, including automobile, medical malpractice, 
and products liability cases, punitive damages awards are very rare.”      
11 Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985).  See also, Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 765 
(applying the apparent authority standard announced in Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hospital, 622 
N.E.2d 788 (Ill. 1993) to the HMO context).  For a similar view, see, Restatement (Second) of 
Agency §267: “One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a 
third person justifiably to rely upon the care of skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to 
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imposition of liability on this basis occurs pursuant to the “apparent authority” 
or “ostensible agency” doctrine.  Similarly, even if the physician and the 
affiliated hospital or medical center treat the physician as an independent 
contractor for internal purposes, vicarious liability may be imposed if the 
hospital or medical center exercises a high degree of control over the physician’s 
medical decisions.  Liability on this basis arises because of “implied agency.”12 
 The liability of an MCO for malpractice by an affiliated physician is more 
complicated because of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA).  ERISA to a degree displaces (“preempts”) state law affecting employee 
benefit plans in the private sector (it does not apply to employee benefit plans for 
government employees).13  Many MCOs, of course, provide health care services 
through employer-sponsored group insurance plans, and are thus covered by 
ERISA preemption.  The scope of this preemption, however, is not entirely clear.   
 Specifically, ERISA preempts state laws that “relate to” a covered 
employee benefit plan.14   The precise meaning of this phrase has been a subject of 
extensive litigation and a number of Supreme Court decisions.  Following the 
Court’s decision in Pilot Life,15 conventional wisdom had it that ERISA preempted 
state law in virtually any lawsuit relating to health care coverage or quality 
under a covered plan.  Some courts thus held that MCOs could not be held liable 
for medical malpractice under state law even if standard agency principles 
would otherwise impose liability.16  But subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
limited the scope of preemption,17 and a number of lower federal and state courts 
then concluded that MCOs can be held liable for malpractice by their actual, 
implied or ostensible agent physicians.18   
                                                                                                                                                 
the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant 
or other agent as if he were such.”  
12  See, e.g., Petrovich, supra. 
13  29 U.S.C. §§1002(32), 1003(b)(1).  See, e.g, McEvoy v. Group Health Cooperative of Eau 
Claire, 570 N.W.2d 397, 406 n.6 (Wis. 1997) (noting that ERISA preemption does not apply to 
benefits plans offered by government employers). 
14 29 U.S.C. §1144(a). 
15 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). 
16  See, e.g., Elsesser v. Hospital of the Phila. College of Osteopathic Medicine, 802 F. Supp. 
1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (finding that ERISA preempted direct liability claim)    
17  New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995) (finding in the field of health care that there is no ERISA preemption 
without clear manifestation of congressional purpose).  See also, De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & 
Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997) (relying on Travelers Ins., and declaring a state statute 
imposing a gross receipt tax on medical centers is not pre-empted by ERISA).  
18    See, Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir 1995) (finding that ERISA did not 
preempt ostensible agency claims).  See also, Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d  at 775 (“An HMO may be 
held vicariously liable for the negligence of its independent-contractor physicians under both the 
doctrines of apparent authority and implied authority.”).  
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 The emergent distinction in the law of ERISA preemption is between 
claims regarding a denial of coverage (preempted because they “relate to” the 
administration of the benefit plan), and claims regarding the quality of care 
provided by the plan (not preempted because they involve medical decisions 
rather than plan administration decisions).  The utility of this distinction may be 
questioned for the reason given above -- malpractice claims and coverage claims 
are not always readily separable -- and some courts have on this basis rejected 
the notion that ERISA preemption can be cabined to “coverage” disputes.19 
Nevertheless, it is probably fair to say that in most jurisdictions, MCOs covered 
by ERISA preemption can nevertheless be reached for physician malpractice to 
the extent that they would otherwise be held liable under the conventional rules 
of vicarious liability. 
 The expansion of vicarious liability for physician malpractice under state 
agency law has not been matched by a judicial willingness to recognize a Federal 
cause of action against the MCO under ERISA.  In Pegram v. Herdrich,20 a health 
plan covered by ERISA provided for treatment by non-HMO physicians only in 
emergencies.  The patient’s HMO physician decided that her condition was not 
serious enough to justify an emergency ultrasound procedure at an unaffiliated 
hospital, and the patient suffered a ruptured appendix as a consequence.  In 
addition to a conventional malpractice claim, the plaintiff argued that her injury 
resulted from an incentive device within the HMO that rewarded physicians for 
reducing costs by, inter alia, cutting back on referrals to physicians outside of the 
HMO.  This physician compensation system had not been disclosed to plan 
subscribers, and its non-disclosure was alleged to be fraud under state law.  The 
state court held that the fraud allegation was preempted, and the patient then 
filed in Federal court claiming that the HMO had committed a breach of its 
fiduciary duty under ERISA (precisely how was somewhat unclear).  In the 
Seventh Circuit, Judge Coffey held that the MCO could be held liable for breach 
of fiduciary duty to the extent that it relied on cost-control devices to limit a 
subscriber’s consumption of medical services.21  The case created much of a stir at 
the time because it branded as unlawful cost-containment devices that were in 
common use in virtually all MCOs.22  It was no surprise therefore that the 
                                                 
19 For example, in Pegram, the Supreme Court in analyzing the “dual 
medical/administrative roles of HMOs” described in Dukes, 57 F.3d at 361, found that “[i]n 
practical terms, these eligibility decisions cannot be untangled from physicians’ judgments about 
reasonable medical treatment . . . .” Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2152-55. 
20 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000). 
21  154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir 1998). 
22  See, Herdich v. Pegram, 170 F.3d 683, 686 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).  For 
pointed criticism, see David Hyman, Medicine in the New Millennium: A Self-Help Guide for the 
Perplexed, 26 Am. J. Law & Med. 143-150 (2000). 
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Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and held that decisions within a 
health plan that involve medical judgment, such as whether an emergency exists 
that would trigger coverage at an unaffiliated hospital, are not “fiduciary” 
decisions and thus cannot result in a breach of fiduciary duty.  The Court thus 
created a substantial roadblock for plaintiffs who would transform their state 
malpractice claims into Federal ERISA claims (which, among other things, would 
allow them to recover attorneys fees).  The Court also observed that cost-cutting 
devices were central to the operation of HMOs, and strongly hinted that the 
mere existence of a particular cost-cutting scheme could not support a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty.23 
 It remains to consider the division of liability between the MCO and the 
physician in cases where both are liable for the physician’s malpractice.  Their 
liability is joint and several, so the plaintiff can collect the judgment from either 
or both defendants as the plaintiff wishes, subject to the constraint that the total 
amount collected cannot exceed the total judgment.24  Under the common law of 
vicarious liability, employers who pay judgments because of torts by their 
employee or independent contractor have a right to seek “indemnity” from 
them.25  That is, the employer may sue the employee or independent contractor 
for the amount paid out by the employer, and collect up to the limit of the 
employee’s or independent contractor’s assets.  In addition to this common law 
right to indemnity, employers and their employees or independent contractors 
are generally allowed to allocate the risk of liability between themselves by 
contract.  Although any contractual allocation of liability will not be binding 
against a successful plaintiff in the face of joint and several liability, it will allow 
the employer and its employee or independent contractor to shift the liability 
between themselves after the plaintiff has collected so that the ultimate liability 
falls wherever the parties to the contract wish it to fall. 
2.  MCO Liability for Wrongful Denial of Coverage 
 All courts seem to agree that disputes over the coverage of an employee 
benefit plan “relate to” the administration of the plan and thus come within 
ERISA’s general preemption clause.  Another part of ERISA, however, exempts 
from preemption the “state regulation of insurance.”26  But the Supreme Court 
                                                 
23 After noting that “inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any HMO scheme,” 
the Court repelled from the potential consequences of the fiduciary claims: “Recovery would be 
warranted simply upon showing that the profit incentive to ration care would generally affect 
mixed decisions, in derogation of the fiduciary standard to act solely in the interest of the patient 
without possibility of conflict.”  The court found that this could lead to the reorganization or 
elimination of HMOs, a decision it averred to be best left to the legislative branch.  Id. at 2150, 56.  
24 For an explanation of joint-and-several liability, see Richard A. Epstein, Torts § 9.2 & n.19 
(1999).  
25 Id., § 9.8 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §886B & cmt. e.). 
26  29 USC §1144(b)(2)(A).   
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has also held that the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA (the provisions that 
afford plan beneficiaries a private right of action for denial of benefits) were 
intended by Congress to be the exclusive remedy for employees suing over a 
denial of benefits.27  Thus, when a dispute arises between a patient and an MCO 
over a coverage matter, the first question is whether the MCO’s activities are part 
of an employer-sponsored plan covered by ERISA.  If the answer is no, then state 
law applicable to such contractual disputes will govern.  If the dispute involves a 
plan covered by ERISA, state law is preempted unless it is part of the state law 
“regulating insurance.”  Even then, it will preempted to the extent that it 
purports to provide any “remedy” for the denial of benefits (as distinguished 
from, say, a rule of insurance contract construction). 
 The practical consequence of this convoluted structure is that a civil 
enforcement action under ERISA is presently the sole legal remedy available to a 
patient who challenges the denial of coverage by an MCO under a plan covered 
by ERISA.  The fact that the plaintiff is confined to the ERISA cause of action may 
not make much difference on the question of liability,28 but it can have profound 
impact on the remedy available to the successful plaintiff.   Under ERISA, the 
successful plaintiff is entitled to an order directing the plan to provide the 
benefits in dispute, plus attorney’s fees.29  Or if the employee has paid for the 
covered benefits out of his own pocket, he can obtain reimbursement.30  Most 
critically, however, consequential damages are not allowed.  Thus, if the denial 
of coverage leads to unfortunate medical consequences, there is no recovery for 
any pain and suffering, lost wages, wrongful death, loss of consortium and the 
like, and no recovery of punitive damages.31 
 Under state law, by contrast, consequential damages may be recoverable 
as long as they are “foreseeable” by the party who breaches the contract,32 at least 
in those cases where the defendant has not successfully disclaimed consequential 
damages, which is difficult, if not impossible to do, in connnection with the 
personal injuries.33 The foreseeability hurdle seems likely to be a modest one 
where an MCO has denied coverage for some treatment of medical importance 
to the patient.  In addition, many states now allow punitive damages against 
insurers who deny coverage without a reasonable basis for doing so (denial of 
                                                 
27  Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52.  
28 To be sure, there may be some differences between ERISA law and state law that will 
affect the determination of whether or not the MCO has breached its contract with the plaintiff.   
29  29 USC §1132(g)(2)(D).   
30  29 USC §1132(g)(2)(A). 
31  See also, Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 53-54 (finding that ERISA does not permit punitive 
damages) (citing Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 135, 147 (1985) (quoting 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981)). 
32  Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
33  See U.C.C. § 2-719 (3). 
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coverage in “bad faith”).  The Supreme Court held in Pilot Life that the state law 
cause of action for bad faith was indeed preempted by ERISA, but state courts 
have allowed that action against MCOs in circumstances where ERISA 
preemption did not apply.34 
3.  Statutory Initiatives at the State Level 
 Public dissatisfaction with managed care has led to a number of initiatives 
in the state legislatures, some of which affect the civil liability of managed care 
organizations.  In California, for example, an MCO will have “a duty of ordinary 
care to arrange for the provision of medically necessary health care service to its 
subscribers and enrollees . . . .”35  Liability attaches to any careless decision that 
results in the “denial, delay or modification” of a service recommended for, or 
furnished to, a subscriber who suffers “substantial harm” as a result.36  Georgia 
requires “ordinary diligence” in reviewing claims for health benefits, and 
imposes liability for injuries that result from a want of care.37 In Texas, an MCO 
“has the duty to exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment 
decisions.”38  An MCO is also statutorily liable for the health care treatment 
decisions of its employees, agents and ostensible agents.39  These statutes 
generally indicate that they do not impose liability for the failure to provide a 
service that is not covered by the benefit plan in question, but only for negligence 
in the delivery of covered services.40 
 Another common provision in these state initiatives prohibits 
indemnification clauses that would require affiliated physicians to reimburse an 
MCO for liabilities it incurs for breach of its duty of care,41 as well as a provision 
that prohibits MCOs from retaliating against physicians that advocate particular 
treatments on behalf of their patients.42  Some statutes also prohibit waiver of the 
MCO’s duty of care, at least by subscribers or enrollees43 and in some cases by 
employers as well.44  A few states have also enacted statutes that require MCOs 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., McEvoy, 570 N.W.2d at 406 n.6 (enforcing common law tort of bad faith against 
HMOs where ERISA preemption did not apply).   
35 Cal. Civ. Code §3428(a) (West, WESTLAW through 1999 portion of 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. 
and 1st Ex. Sess.). 
36 See, id. §3428(a)(1)-(2). 
37 Ga. Code Ann. §51-1-48 (LEXIS through the 1999 General Assembly). 
38 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. §88.002(a) (LEXIS through the 2000 Supp. (1999 Sess.)). 
39 See, id. §88.002(b)(1)-(4). 
40  See, e.g., id. §88.002(d).   
41  See, e.g., id. §88.002(g); see also, Cal. Civ. Code §3428(d); and Conn. Gen. Stat. §38a-472a 
(LEXIS through 1997-98 Sess.). 
42  See Tex. Civ Prac. & Rem. §88.002(f).  See also, Okla. Stat. tit. 63, §2528.5 (LEXIS through 
1998 Second and 1999 First Ext. Sess.) (prohibiting retaliation against physicians who testify at 
internal or external reviews on behalf of patients in coverage disputes). 
43  See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code §3428(f). 
44  See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §51-1-48(b).   
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to afford subscribers an opportunity to obtain an independent review of any 
decision to deny coverage.45 
 In the absence of amendments to ERISA, it is uncertain how many of these 
statutes can survive challenge on grounds of ERISA preemption.  Statutes that 
merely codify the common law of vicarious liability for malpractice are likely to 
survive preemption challenges.  Statutes that create state causes of action for the 
denial of benefits under plans covered by ERISA, or require that independent 
review procedures to be followed after a denial of benefits, are likely to be 
preempted on the grounds that ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions provide the 
exclusive remedy for aggrieved subscribers.46   
 The gray area concerns the statutes that impose a duty of care on MCOs to 
provide covered services in a timely manner, and that prohibit indemnification 
clauses, retaliation against physicians, and waiver of statutory protection.  A 
Texas statute containing such provisions (except the no-waiver provision) 
survived a preemption challenge in the Fifth Circuit.47  The court reasoned that 
the statute really does no more than impose vicarious liability for malpractice, 
given its stipulation that it does not in any way expand “coverage” under health 
plans.  Likewise, the anti-indemnification provisions and anti-retaliation 
provisions do not compel any particular level of coverage, the court argued, but 
simply regulate MCOs in the interest of patient safety, much like state 
malpractice law.  The soundness of this reasoning may certainly be questioned.  
Suits alleging a want of ordinary care in a decision made by an MCO will very 
often implicate issues of coverage (such as the question whether an emergency 
existed in Herdrich), and state actions regarding coverage are generally held to be 
preempted as noted.  The problem is even more acute with statutes (such as 
Georgia’s) that require “diligence” in claims processing, and that may well lead 
to lawsuits over delays relating to uncertainties about coverage.  Likewise, anti-
indemnification and anti-retaliation provisions effectively constrain the terms on 
which MCOs can offer health care coverage to employers, and may thus be said 
to “relate to” the benefit plans quite directly.  Absent legislative clarification at 
the Federal level, therefore, these issues may require guidance from the Supreme 
Court. 
4.  Federal Initiatives -- the “Patient’s Bill of Rights” 
 The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives are presently considering a 
number of competing versions of a “Patient’s Bill of Rights,” aimed largely at the 
                                                 
45  See, e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 63, §2528.5. 
46 See Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance, 2000 WL 792435 
(5th Cir. 2000) (holding that Texas statute requiring independent review of claims denials was 
pre-empted).   
47 Id. 
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managed care industry and the problems it is perceived to have created.  Much 
of the proposed legislation concerns the scope of coverage offered by MCOs, and 
would have little direct effect on the civil liability of managed care organizations.  
One of us has already written at some length on these proposals with a critical 
eye.48  A few of the provisions do affect the liability of MCOs directly, however, 
and warrant attention here. 
 One Senate Bill, S. 1344, would revamp the disclosure obligations under 
ERISA, and require plans to provide considerably more information to 
subscribers than presently.  Among other things, plans would have to disclose 
the way in which physicians are compensated, including any incentives for cost 
reductions that might come at the expense of patient care (recall Herdrich).49  The 
Bill would also impose new requirements regarding the procedures for denial of 
claims by an ERISA-covered health plan.  In particular, an internal appeals 
process is required along with an option for a subsequent independent review, 
and each procedure is regulated as to its timeline.  Failure to adhere to the 
timeline or to respect the results of an outside review is punishable by fines, and 
patients can seek reimbursement plus attorneys fees for any services that the 
plan should have covered but did not. 
 Other proposals, such as H.R. 2990, contemplate more extensive changes.  
Like S.1344, this Bill introduces new requirements respecting the procedures for 
the denial of claims, including internal appeals and the option for an 
independent review,50 and it would also enhance the disclosure requirements 
under ERISA.51  But it adds an anti-retaliation provision, similar to those enacted 
at the state level, to protect physicians who advocate care on behalf of their 
patients.52  And perhaps most importantly, it would amend ERISA’s preemption 
provisions to provide that actions under state law may be brought for personal 
injury or wrongful death against any person “in connection with the provision of 
insurance, administrative services, or medical services by such person to or for a 
group health plan...”53  If enacted, this language would plainly protect many of 
the recent state initiatives from a preemption challenge.  It goes on to provide 
that in such actions, punitive damages may not be recovered as long as the 
health plan has complied with the requisite procedures for internal and 
independent review of claims denial.54 
B.  Analysis 
                                                 
48 Richard Epstein, Managed Care Under Siege, 24 J. Medicine & Philosophy 343 (1999). 
49 S. 1344, 106th Cong. § 111 (1999). 
50 H.R. 2990, 106th Cong. §§ 1101-04 (1999). 
51 Id. §1121. 
52 Id. §1135. 
53  Id. § 1302. 
54 Id. 
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 The extant and proposed rules governing MCO liability are complex and 
raise a number of distinct normative issues.  It is helpful to divide them into 
three broad categories: (1) the wisdom of imposing vicarious liability on MCOs 
for the malpractice of affiliated physicians in accordance with state agency law; 
(2) the wisdom of efforts to introduce a new remedy for wrongful denial of 
coverage in addition to or in lieu of the existing civil enforcement action under 
ERISA; and (3) the wisdom of various measures that constrain freedom of 
contract between MCOs and their physicians or subscribers, including anti-
indemnification rules, anti-retaliation rules, and rules that prohibit waiver of 
statutory duties. 
1.  Vicarious Liability for Malpractice 
 Economic Background.  Vicarious liability responds to two potential 
problems.55  First, the financial assets of many employees are insufficient to cover 
judgments against them for the torts that they commit in the course of their jobs.  
If employees are unable to pay judgments, they may lack the incentive to invest 
in the efficient level of care to avoid accidents.  In addition, if employees lack the 
assets to pay judgments, their wage demands may not reflect the full extent of 
their expected liability.  Business enterprises will then avoid paying the full cost 
of harms that they cause, and the scale of risky activity may become inefficiently 
large.  Finally, because a contractual assumption of liability by the employer 
would put more assets at risk, employers and employees may elect to leave the 
liability on the employee even when the employee is risk averse and the 
employer is the superior risk bearer.  For essentially the same reason, risk averse 
employees may elect not to buy any liability insurance and instead to take their 
chances on bankruptcy.   
 Vicarious liability can ameliorate these inefficiencies.  By placing the 
employer’s assets at risk, employers will have an incentive to exercise whatever 
control they have over their employees to induce them to behave more carefully, 
and the joint incentive to invest in care will be optimal as long as the combined 
assets of the employer and employee are sufficient to cover judgments against 
them.56  If employers can observe carelessness directly, they can require careful 
behavior as a condition of employment.  Where care is not directly observable at 
all times, a moral hazard arises but other monitoring devices may nevertheless 
be employed to induce employees to be more careful than they would be 
otherwise.  Threats of discharge or demotion in the event of accidents, spot 
                                                 
55 The general analysis of vicarious liability is developed at length in Alan O. Sykes, The 
Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L.J. 1231 (1984).  For an account of the rules, see Richard 
A. Epstein, Torts § 9.9 & 9.10 (1999). 
56 This proposition assumes that damages judgments are equal to the social value of the 
harms caused by employees.   
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checks for the level of care, and perhaps the threat of an indemnity action can 
combine to enhance the employee’s incentives for care.   
 In addition, vicarious liability forces the business enterprise to internalize 
the costs of harms that it causes.  It thus tends to reduce the scale of risky activity 
to the proper level.57    
 Finally, because a contractual assumption of liability by the employer no 
longer has the effect of placing more assets at risk, vicarious liability eliminates 
the possible incentive to leave liability inefficiently on a highly risk averse 
employee.  Likewise, if the risk is better laid off on the insurance market, there is 
no longer any disincentive to doing so, and indeed the employer may be the best 
party to purchase insurance, buying a single policy to cover everyone in the 
workforce. 
 Putting aside the possible insolvency of the employee, a second potential 
problem in the absence of vicarious liability -- albeit a less important one -- arises 
where the transaction costs of contracting between employers and employees 
impede a contractual allocation of risk between them.  The rules of vicarious 
liability can then serve as potentially useful “default” rules, allocating the risk of 
liability to the employer or the employee, as the case may be, in accordance with 
which of them is likely to be the better risk bearer. 
 A third rationale for vicarious liability also deserves mention.  In many 
business situations, it is clear that the harm in question has been caused by some 
employee or employees, but it is not clear by which.58  Absent vicarious liability, 
the firm can hide behind the inability of the injured party to identify the 
individual wrongdoer, thus leading to systematic underdeterrence of the wrong.  
This problem can be effectively avoided by vicarious liability no matter whether 
the risk was caused jointly or individually by workers.  And once vicarious 
liability is imposed, the firm has strong incentives to keep track of the behavior 
of its own employees. 
 Vicarious liability will be of little benefit, and may simply increase 
litigation costs, when the above conditions that favor it do not arise.  Thus, if 
there is no potential insolvency on the part of employees, little reason to think 
that employers are the superior risk bearer, and no causal uncertainties, vicarious 
liability is likely undesirable.  Similarly, if employers have little ability to induce 
their employees to behave more carefully, the benefits of vicarious liability are 
lessened.  
                                                 
57 The caveat is that if liability is only for negligence, any harms that occur when due care is 
taken will still be externalized.  Of course, under a rule of strict liability, a reverse externality runs 
from victims to injurers.  Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).  
58  Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, XXX 
(1986). 
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 One of us has argued elsewhere that the common law rules of vicarious 
liability are broadly responsive to these economic considerations.59  The doctrine 
of respondeat superior tends to impose liability on employers when employees 
have limited assets, and when employers have monitoring techniques available 
to them to induce employees to behave more carefully.  The typical employee for 
whom employers are held liable may also be quite risk averse and thus a poor 
risk bearer.  The general rule that employers are not liable for torts by their 
independent contractors can similarly be justified on the grounds that 
independent contractors tend to have more substantial assets (often including 
their own liability insurance), that the ability of employers to monitor them and 
induce greater care is much weaker, and that there is often little reason to believe 
that the employer is less risk averse. 
 Application to MCOs.  At times, it may well be efficient for entities such as 
hospitals and MCOs to bear vicarious liability for physician malpractice.  The 
young resident or intern, for example, on salary at an HMO hospital, may well 
have limited assets and be unlikely to purchase adequate malpractice coverage if 
left to her own devices.  In addition, the young physician may well require (and 
receive) considerable supervision by more senior physicians to avoid errors in 
care, so that the HMO hospital has considerable capacity to monitor her.  On 
these assumptions, the standard arguments for vicarious liability apply readily. 
 When physicians establish independent practices and carry substantial 
malpractice insurance on their own, by contrast, the case for vicarious liability is 
much weaker.  The physicians’ personal assets, including malpractice coverage, 
become considerable and the problem of potential insolvency greatly diminishes.  
Further, the ability of hospitals or MCOs to monitor these independent 
physicians is extremely limited, as there is no one with greater medical expertise 
in the hierarchy regularly overseeing their work.  We thus doubt that vicarious 
liability for independent physicians with their own malpractice coverage will 
accomplish much beyond adding an additional party to litigation, which of 
course is costly in itself.  And the likely result of vicarious liability under these 
circumstances may simply be an effort to shift the liability back to careless 
physicians by contract (if that is allowed, as we discuss below). 
 To a degree, the application of standard common law principles to MCOs 
and their affiliated physicians will track this economic logic.  Vicarious liability at 
common law is likely to be imposed for malpractice by a physician on salary at a 
hospital or HMO. By contrast, a physician who has an independent practice and 
her own malpractice coverage is likely to be deemed an independent contractor, 
                                                 
59 See Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability. 
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and any hospitals or MCOs with which the physician is affiliated will ordinarily 
not be subject to vicarious liability. 
 Certain exceptions to this “independent contractor rule,” however, have 
been at the heart of much recent litigation in the area.60  As noted earlier, 
plaintiffs can reach beyond the negligent physician on a theory of “implied 
agency” or “ostensible agency.”  Both of these doctrines, in the abstract, have 
some logic as traditionally applied at common law.  Where an “independent 
contractor” is in fact controlled by another entity in making decisions about care 
(the “implied agency” case), the imposition of liability on that entity may be 
desirable to help promote proper incentives for care.  If the independent 
contractor has substantial assets at risk, of course, he may seek a contractual 
assumption of liability by the entity that exercises control, and the imposition of 
vicarious liability may be superfluous.  But whether it is accomplished by 
contract or by the common law, it makes good sense for the party who selects the 
level of care to bear the risk of error.  Likewise, liability for the “ostensible agent” 
makes sense where the public is induced to deal with a particular independent 
contractor on false pretenses. The paradigm case here would be one in which the 
public is led to believe that an impecunious independent contractor is in fact an 
employee of another entity, so that the apparent employer’s assets would be 
available to satisfy a judgment in the event of carelessness by the apparent 
employee.  The actual cases that have been litigated often deny independent 
contractor status to groups of emergency physicians who appear to the outside 
world to be an operating division of the hospital or medical center of which they 
are a part.61   
 In principle, either scenario might justify the imposition of liability on an 
MCO for independent contractor physicians.  In practice, however, we doubt 
that the conditions justifying such liability will be satisfied very often.   
 The fact that an MCO exercises some independent judgment about the 
medical necessity of particular care, for example, or utilizes some cost control 
device that makes physicians think twice about ordering expensive procedures, 
is quite insufficient in our view to convert the physician into an “implied agent” 
anytime a malpractice allegation arises.  As long as the care decision resides with 
the independent contractor physician, economic logic suggests that liability 
should reside with that physician as well.  It is only when the MCO overrules the 
physician and dictates a course of care contrary to the physician’s 
recommendations that a shift of liability may be warranted.  Indeed, the 
physician may have a defense to a malpractice claim in such cases, and it may 
then become quite important that a patient have a distinct cause of action against 
                                                 
60 See Petrovich, supra. 
61  Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So.2d 358 (Miss. 1971). 
MCO E/S December 12, 2000  17
the MCO -- we return to this issue below when we discuss actions relating to 
denial of coverage.  But putting aside this class of cases, findings of implied 
agency against MCOs are likely inappropriate. 
 Likewise, claims of “ostensible agency” typically ring quite hollow.  The 
independent contractor physicians who affiliate with MCOs are not in general 
impecunious, and rarely can the argument be made that they are unable to pay 
for their torts.  Nor is it often plausible that patients have been induced to deal 
with these physicians on the false premise that the MCO has somehow certified 
their financial soundness.  The mere fact that the physicians are part of a network 
or HMO, and that the details of their affiliation with the MCO are not widely 
disseminated, are wholly insufficient to induce the sort of mistaken reliance on 
the physician’s status hat might justify a finding of ostensible agency. 
 If we are right that insolvency is usually not a serious concern with 
independent contractor physicians, however, why are plaintiffs’ lawyers so 
interested in reaching the MCOs as well?  The answer, we suspect, as noted 
above, is that the MCO is a much less sympathetic defendant than the individual 
physician.  Juries will be more generous with their compensatory awards, and 
more disposed toward punitive awards, when the faceless, cost-cutting MCO is 
implicated as contributing to the plaintiff’s bad medical outcome.  Unless one 
believes that juries undercompensate today in malpractice cases involving 
individual physicians, therefore, adding the MCO to the mix may result in 
nothing more than an excessive award and additional litigation costs that will 
reduce the capacity of MCOs to control expenses in the interests of all. 
 The effort by the plaintiff in Herdrich to convert a garden variety 
malpractice claim into a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA raises 
still further concerns.  Some of the remedies  for breach of fiduciary duty -- such 
as disgorgement of profits -- simply do not fit well with the malpractice action.  
Damages to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries, and thus to encourage the 
care-provider to internalize the costs of mistakes, are more appropriate.  And 
while one can wonder about the wisdom of the American rule regarding 
attorneys fees in tort actions generally, there is no reason to depart from it simply 
because a physician happens to be affiliated with an MCO. 
 In sum, when the physician qualifies as an independent contractor under 
agency law and has substantial malpractice coverage of her own, we believe that 
efforts to impose vicarious liability on the MCO because of implied or ostensible 
agency should generally be  
rejected.  The significant class of exceptions arises when the MCO has refused to 
permit the physician to provide the care that the physician recommends, and 
that decision has arguably caused the harm to the plaintiff.  As this situation is 
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more properly viewed as a coverage dispute than as a malpractice claim, we deal 
with it separately below. 
 
2.  Liability for Wrongful Denial of Coverage 
 Because of ERISA preemption, many participants in MCOs are limited to a 
civil enforcement action under ERISA when challenging the denial of benefits by 
their health plans.  As noted, the ERISA remedy simply allows the successful 
plaintiff to obtain an order directing the plan to provide the benefits, or to 
reimburse the plaintiff for services purchased elsewhere, plus attorneys fees.  No 
consequential damages are allowed, even if the wrongful denial of coverage 
resulted in great pain and suffering or even death. 
 It is not difficult to fashion an argument that the ERISA remedy is 
inadequate.  Because the premiums charged by health plans to employers and 
subscribers are generally fixed at an amount that is independent of the care 
provided, the argument runs, reduced expenditures on care mean more profits 
for the health plan.  A plan that wrongfully denies benefits at a minimum defers 
an expenditure and captures the time value of the money, even if the sums saved 
today eventually be spent tomorrow.  And if the patient does not have the sense 
or wherewithal to challenge the denial effectively, the wrongful denial is pure 
gain.  A self-serving health plan may balance the prospect of paying plaintiff’s 
attorney fees at the end of litigation against the benefits of delaying an 
expenditure or perhaps avoiding it altogether, and might conclude that a 
deliberate, wrongful denial of benefits is a good bet.  Indeed, the calculus may be 
even more favorable toward wrongful denial if the plan anticipates that it can 
settle the cases that are brought quickly with minimal expenditures necessary to 
compensate plaintiffs’ attorneys.     
 The problem is not limited to deliberate, wrongful denials.  Callous or 
overworked plan administrators may also deny benefits without exercising 
sufficient care to ascertain whether they should be provided.  These careless 
denials of benefits may work great harm to a subscriber in medical need, and 
because the consequential damages associated with such harms are not 
recoverable, carelessness in processing claims for or in authorizing treatment 
may be seriously underdeterred.  To provide proper deterrence of such behavior, 
the argument runs, the plan must be made to pay for the harms that are caused 
by wrongful denial of benefits, whether deliberate or careless.  Only an award of 
consequential damages, in addition to the current relief provided by ERISA, will 
achieve that objective.  And of the legal initiatives discussed earlier, only a 
Federal statute can provide the needed changes in ERISA. 
 This argument has considerable force, and may in the end be convincing.  
But we add some important cautions.  First, the notion that ERISA-covered plans 
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can deny benefits willy-nilly without significant penalty is plainly exaggerated.  
If administrators regularly deny valid claims or authorization for treatment, 
employers will hear about it and will be strongly urged by their employees to 
change health plans.  Word of such behavior can also disseminate across firms as 
human resources administrators communicate with each other.  In short, the 
usual market constraints associated with repeat dealing and reputation are 
operative to a significant degree, even if they do not eliminate all problems. 
 Second, changes to the available remedy will no doubt introduce new 
error costs.  In the malpractice area, scholarly studies suggest that the courts are 
rather poor at identifying malpractice -- many bona fide cases of malpractice are 
overlooked, while lawsuits often focus on cases where the physician did nothing 
wrong.62  The question whether the denial of a claim or an authorization for 
treatment was wrongful may not raise quite the same issues, but certainly raises 
related ones.  The plan’s judgment about medical necessity, or the existence of an 
emergency, will often be at the heart of a dispute (as the Supreme Court noted in 
Herdrich).  And given the diversity of medical opinions on the proper course of 
treatment for particular patients, it may not be difficult for a plaintiff to find an 
expert willing to opine that some treatment was “necessary” or “non-
experimental.”  Juries may be no better at sorting out such complicated issues, 
and no less inclined to help out the sympathetic plaintiff, than they are in 
standard malpractice cases.  One must therefore wonder whether erroneous 
judgments against health plans might increase the costs of care significantly and 
discourage greatly efforts at cost control.   
 Third, we note the practice of contracting away from consequential 
damages is routine in virtually all sales transactions governed by the Uniform 
Commercial Code and similar statutes.  The same pattern appears whether the 
transactions are between merchants or, as is the case here, between merchants 
and consumers.63  Given the range of transactions that adopt the same position, 
we think that is unlikely that the uniform practice could be attributable—much 
less attributable solely—to some defect in market structure or to some systematic 
want of information by the consumer party.  Rather we think that it is likely that 
some of the economic pressures that produce these contracts between 
commercial equals can also operate here.  Certainly the need to control 
                                                 
62 See generally, Paul C. Weiler, A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, Malpractice 
Litigation, and Patient Compensation (1993); Statement of Robert Brook, in Medical Necessity: 
From Theory to Practice 47-51, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Health, Education Labor 
and Pensions, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 2, 1999) (discussing studies finding that about 1/3 of 
medical procedures provided are unnecessary, and that patients who need procedures do not get 
them about 1/3 of the time). 
63 See Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability:  Consequential Damages in the Law of 
Contract, 18 J. Legal Stud. 104 (1989). 
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administrative costs, reduce error, and to prevent the implicit cross-subsidy 
between those plan members that are likely to protest from those who are 
compliant has a lot to do with the overall picture. 
 However one comes out on the broader issue of whether to amend ERISA 
to permit higher damages awards, we have particular concerns about some of 
the recent changes in state law noted earlier.  Recall that a number of the state 
statutes impose a duty of ordinary care on MCOs, noting that they do not 
expand the “coverage” of benefit plans, while the courts continue to suggest that 
the sole remedy for a denial of coverage is a civil enforcement action under 
ERISA.  This situation invites some unintended complications.  Consider an 
employer-sponsored health plan that has initially refused to cover or authorize 
some treatment that a subscriber wants.  After further consideration, the plan 
changes its mind and is willing to pay for the treatment in question, but in the 
meantime the patient has suffered some harm because of the delay.  If the plan 
admits that the treatment was “covered” all along, it opens itself up to a state 
action for breach of its duty of care.  By contrast, if the plan stonewalls in its 
original position and insists that the treatment is not “covered,” it has an 
argument that the sole remedy is the ERISA civil enforcement action.  
Accordingly, the incentive may be for the plan that initially denies coverage to 
fight tooth and nail to defend its denial, even if it later comes to believe that it 
made a mistake.  The unintended consequences for subscribers may thus be quite 
unfortunate. 
 The question also arises whether state actions for “bad faith” denial of 
benefits, which in some jurisdictions allow the recovery of punitive damages, 
should be allowed if ERISA is amended.  One argument for punitive damages 
against insurers who breach first-party insurance contracts is that in their 
absence, insureds with high subjective discount rates would be induced to settle 
for considerably less than they are entitled to under their insurance contracts.  In 
other words, insurers will exploit their insureds’ desperate need for money to 
induce them to settle for a smaller sum than they should properly receive -- the 
prospect of compensatory damages at the end of a long litigation is an inferior 
alternative.64  At first blush, this argument might seem applicable to MCO 
subscribers, who may desperately need particular care to improve their quality 
of life or even to survive.  But on further reflection, the desperation of a seriously 
ill patient is not likely to induce the patient to settle for less than the care that he 
believes is necessary to make him well.  When the issue is what health care will 
be provided, as opposed to what amount of money the insured will accept to 
settle a monetary claim, it is not clear that an insurer can exploit the insured’s 
                                                 
64 See, Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First-Party Insurers, 25 J. Legal 
Stud. 405 (1996).  
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high “discount rate.”  The argument for punitive damages to prevent such 
exploitation then carries little weight. 
 Another more familiar argument for punitive damages is that they can 
correct for an underdetection or underenforcement problem.  Applying the 
argument to MCOs, the theory would be that when an MCO denies benefits 
wrongfully, the denial will be challenged with probability less than 1.0.  If 
damages are merely compensatory, the argument runs, the expected cost to the 
MCO of wrongful denial is less than the actual cost to subscribers on average, 
and too much of it will occur.   
 This argument is more convincing, as it simply requires a degree of 
ignorance on the part of MCO subscribers that would lead them to forego 
treatment to which they are entitled with some regularity.  But even here we 
could expect some increased level of consumer awareness, given the high stakes 
to the parties, and the presence of aggressive intermediaries (unions, 
cooperatives, lawyers, public officials) who will take steps to inform plan 
members of their statutory rights.  Further, if an argument for punitive damages 
may be fashioned along these lines, it is important that they be calibrated 
sensibly.  The goal should be to correct for any underenforcement problem, and 
the difficulty is that punitive damages for “bad faith” are not calibrated to that 
end.  Juries are told to look at factors such as the egregiousness of the 
defendant’s conduct and the defendant’s wealth.65   None of these factors bears 
much relationship to the underlying issue.  Hence, there can be little confidence 
that allowing punitive damages to be assessed against MCOs under existing state 
law would improve matters.  It is noteworthy that H.R. 2990 (and some of the 
other bills introduced in Washington) would protect MCOs against punitive 
damages as long as they comply with certain appeal procedures for subscribers 
who challenge a denial of benefits.  
3.  Limitations on Contracts with MCOs 
 With proper remedies in place for malpractice and for wrongful denial of 
coverage, there is little basis for interfering with the ability of MCOs, physicians 
and employers to allocate liability risks by contract.  Accordingly, anti-
indemnification rules, anti-retaliation rules and rules against waiver of new 
causes of action are suspect. 
 Anti-Indemnification Rules.  The typical anti-indemnification rule under 
recent state statutes, as noted, prohibits MCOs from pursuing indemnity against 
                                                 
65 See, Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 379 (Wis. 1978) (noting that the 
appropriate standard for permitting punitive damages the context of bad faith is the showing of 
“an evil intent deserving of punishment or of something in the nature of special ill-will or wanton 
disregard of duty or gross or outrageous conduct”). This is essentially the standard for punitive 
damages adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 (punitive damages are appropriate 
for “outrageous” conduct, “evil motive,” or “reckless indifference to the rights of others”). 
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affiliated physicians after the MCO has been held liable for breach of its duty of 
care.  The prohibition applies even if the contract between the physician and the 
MCO expressly provides for indemnity.  The argument for such rules, we 
suppose, is that the MCO will otherwise exercise its “bargaining power” to force 
physicians to accept an indemnity agreement that is not in the best interests of 
physicians and their patients.  The MCO will avoid having to pay for its own 
intentional misconduct or carelessness, resulting in an undesirable increase in 
such behavior by the MCO.   
 Such arguments are familiar from other settings, and almost always 
deeply flawed for essentially the same reasons.  An MCO will wish to include an 
indemnity arrangement in its contract with physicians only if it profits from the 
arrangement.  Physicians have reservation wages just like all other participants 
in labor markets, and if an MCO requires physicians to indemnify it against 
liability, that reduces the level of physician compensation, other things being 
equal.  The MCO must then pay physicians more direct compensation to induce 
them to affiliate with the MCO.  The indemnity arrangement will be desired by 
the MCO, therefore, only if the increase in direct compensation that it 
necessitates is less than the expected value of the MCO’s own liability in the 
absence of the indemnity arrangement.  In turn, the required increase in direct 
physician compensation under an indemnity arrangement will be at least equal 
to the expected value of the indemnity payments that physicians must make.  
Indeed, it may be considerably greater that that if the physician, whose portfolio 
of risk is underdiversified, is risk averse and worried about the variance in her 
expected income with an indemnity arrangement. 
 Suppose, then, that the indemnity arrangement indeed increases the 
amount of wrongful behavior by the MCO, and increases the attendant liability 
to subscribers, which is now borne by the physicians pursuant to an indemnity 
agreement.  In that event, the requisite increase in direct compensation to 
physicians under the indemnity arrangement will exceed the direct costs of 
liability to the MCO without an indemnity arrangement.  If this were the case, it 
would be irrational for the MCO to insist on an indemnity arrangement.  The fact 
that an indemnity arrangement is commonly observed suggests that the parties 
to the contract expect it to lower, not increase, their joint liability to subscribers.  
And that will be true only if it reduces, not increases, the damages payable as a 
result of the wrongful behavior by the MCO.  Notice that this argument in no 
way turns on any assumptions about the relative “bargaining power” of MCOs 
and physicians. 
 A possible objection to the above reasoning relates to the information 
available about the value of indemnity.  If physicians systematically 
underestimate the expected cost of indemnity to them, they may “sell” 
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indemnity agreements too cheaply.  MCOs might then profit from them even if 
they increased the harm from actionable negligence.  But we can imagine no 
basis for supposing that physicians will as a group underestimate the costs of 
agreeing to indemnify MCOs.  Accordingly, we would expect any 
indemnification arrangements negotiated with MCOs to be efficient rather than 
inefficient. 
 The possible utility of indemnification is easy to see.  Even where an MCO 
has been found negligent for, say, refusing to provide some treatment on the 
grounds that it is not “medically necessary,” affiliated physicians may well share 
in the blame.  The denial of coverage might result as much from the failure of the 
physician to provide clear and credible justification for the recommended 
treatment as from carelessness on the part of the MCOs decisionmaker.  If so, the 
value of inducing greater care on the part of physicians in making their 
recommendations may exceed the costs of reducing the incentives for care within 
the MCO.  
 The value of allowing indemnity actions may be even greater owing to the 
dynamics of tort litigation.  So long as the treating physician is protected against 
suit by statutory prohibitions against indemnity actions, then she could easily 
team up with the plaintiff in order to send, as it were, a message to the MCO.  
Juries in many cases are reluctant to impose extensive liability against individual 
physicians who live in their own communities, but that reluctance is likely to 
vanish when it becomes possible “to send a message” to an impersonal or distant 
corporation.  
 In short, the parties to the contract are better situated than anyone else to 
determine what allocation of liability will minimize the losses from mistakes, and 
the law should thus respect their allocation of liability.  Blanket prohibitions on 
indemnification arrangements, such as those found in a number of recent state 
statutes, are unsound. 
 Anti-Retaliation Rules.  These rules prohibit MCOs from punishing 
physicians who advocate care on behalf of their patients.  If adequate remedies 
exist for wrongful denial of coverage, however, the costs to subscribers from 
such behavior will be internalized by the MCO and its affiliated physicians.  
When it appears that a physician has been the target of “retaliation” under these 
circumstances, there is nevertheless no case for interfering with freedom of 
contract between physicians and MCOs because no harm results to third parties 
by hypothesis. 
 The caveat relates to the assumption that the remedy for wrongful denial 
of coverage is adequate.  We have already suggested in the last section that 
changes in the ERISA remedy may be appropriate.  Further, for an MCO 
subscriber to establish that coverage was wrongfully denied, testimony from the 
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subscriber’s physician will often be required.  If MCOs are allowed to retaliate 
against physicians who provide honest cooperation to a subscriber complaining 
about a denial of coverage, therefore, the adequacy of the remedy may be 
undermined.  It may thus make sense for the law to prohibit retaliation against a 
physician who provides helpful information to a subscriber seeking to secure 
coverage through an internal or independent review process, or during a lawsuit 
alleging a wrongful denial of coverage.  The analogy is to rules that prevent an 
employer from retaliating against an employee who reports a statutory violation 
or who files a workers’ compensation claim.  Broader anti-retaliation rules, 
however, such as those in the Texas statute that prohibit retaliation for all 
advocacy on behalf of patients (whether or not connected to the dispute 
resolution process) may make it impossible for MCOs to rid themselves of 
physicians whose medical judgment is regularly at odds with reasonable efforts 
at cost containment. 
 Anti-Waiver Rules.  Some state statutes restrict the capacity of parties who 
deal with MCOs to waive their statutory rights of action.  In discussing these 
rules, it is useful to distinguish two variants -- those that make it impossible for 
subscribers to waive their rights, and those that make it impossible for employers 
to waive the rights of all employee-subscribers to a health plan. 
 The argument for preventing patients from waiving their rights is a 
familiar one -- they may be induced to waive rights of action in some standard 
consent to treatment form or other document filled with fine print, without ever 
reading it or understanding it.  They will then grant the waiver too cheaply (or 
for nothing), and the valuable incentives created by the statutory cause of action 
will be lost.   
 Although this concern perhaps justifies restrictions on the ability of 
individual subscribers to waive their rights under a health plan, it is noteworthy 
that such restrictions on waiver could be written into the plan itself.  The market 
can thus provide wavier restrictions if they are valuable.  And if employers, who 
are informed on these matters, do not seek them on behalf of their employees, 
their utility is then in some doubt.   
 Our greater concern, however, is with restrictions on the ability of 
employers to waive or limit causes of action against MCOs.  Simple economics 
suggests that employers have an interest in providing fringe benefits to their 
employees when the employees will value them at an amount greater than the 
cost to the employer.  If waivers or limitations on rights to sue are inefficient, so 
that the price to the employer for excluding them from the plan is exceeded by 
the loss to the employees from including them, the employer’s self-interest 
should lead to their exclusion.   
MCO E/S December 12, 2000  25
 This simple argument assumes, of course, that employers and employees 
collectively do not undervalue the right to sue ex ante, and agree to waivers or 
other limitations too cheaply.  One can imagine this problem occurring on 
occasion, particularly with small employers that may have little sophistication in 
employee benefits matters.  But if large employers with substantial human 
resources departments would agree to waivers or other limitations on suit, the 
inference that they are harmful is largely dispelled.66 
 The possible utility of agreements between employers and MCOs 
to reduce the MCOs’ exposure to liability is again easy to see.  If MCOs’ become 
liable for consequential damages for negligently denying treatment to 
subscribers, or punitive damages for “bad faith,” the potential costs to them of 
denying treatment increase greatly.  And as noted earlier, it would be a mistake 
to suppose that courts can adjudicate these cases without error.  Plaintiffs will 
generally be sympathetic to juries and MCOs quite unsympathetic.  We have no 
way to know how serious this problem might become, but it is by no means 
inconceivable that the costs of errors in the administration of a new remedy 
might exceed its benefits.  If at that point large employers prefer to agree to a 
curtailment of the right to sue, the system should not prevent it, but should 
instead take that development as a strong signal that things have gone awry. 
 
II.  The Class Actions 
Few institutional practices in the modern legal scene invite sharper 
differences of opinion than the modern class action.  In the eyes of some, the class 
action supplies the ordinary person the keys to the courthouse, which would 
otherwise be inaccessible to individuals with small claims.  To others, the class 
action is a giant club that allows plaintiffs lawyers to extract large settlements 
from defendants who fear adverse verdicts in “you-bet-your-company” 
situations.67  Both over generalizations are dangerous.  The broad subject matter 
                                                 
66 Of course, even small firms can hire third parties to supply the expertise that they lack 
internally. 
67  See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), in which Judge Posner 
acting on a petition for mandamus ordered decertification of a class based in part upon  
a concern with forcing these defendants to stake their companies on the outcome 
of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if 
they have no legal liability, when it is entirely feasible to allow a final, 
authoritative determination of their liability . . . to emerge from a decentralized 
process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and different standards of 
liability, in different jurisdictions; and when, in addition, the preliminary 
indications are that the defendants are not liable for the grievous harm that has 
befallen the members of the class.   
Id. at 1299.  It is worth noting that since this decision, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have 
been amended to include R. 23(f), which grants to circuit courts discretionary review of district 
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range of class actions—antitrust, corporate derivative suits, consumer and 
securities fraud, tort claims, breach of warranty—defies easy characterization.  In 
some contexts, the use of class actions seems relatively uncontroversial, but in 
others, such as the suits against tobacco companies and MCOs, the use of class 
actions is anything but.  We begin our analysis with a brief review of the logic of 
class actions, with attention to their benefits and pitfalls in various 
circumstances. 
A.  The Costs and Benefits of Class Actions 
The Plaintiff’s Perspective.  Let us assume that an individual has a valid 
claim worth $1,000 that costs $1,500 to collect.  Under the American rule where 
each side bears its own legal expenses, as a first approximation we can be 
confident that suit will not be brought.  The plaintiff who wins the action is 
worse off than if he had never brought the case at all.  That calculation, of course, 
can be made far more complex by the introduction of a few confounding 
variables.  The defendant may have to spend $1,500 to defend the claim as well, 
so that a well-timed demand letter by a plaintiff may elicit a payment or 
settlement without having to incur the full $1,500 in legal costs.  Yet the 
defendant who knows the plaintiff’s cost structure may just ignore the demand, 
believing that the plaintiff has no interest in forcing the defendant to lose $2,500 
in fees and payments for the privilege of losing $500 himself.  The basic 
calculations only become more complicated when the plaintiff’s claim is of 
uncertain validity or uncertain amount. 
The basic assumption behind the class action is that the amalgamation of 
individual claims will alter for the better the ratio between the size of the 
anticipated recovery and the costs of obtaining it: the cost per unit claim drops as 
the number of claims rises.  Thus if 1000 claims are brought together, the total 
size of the pot goes from $1,000 to $1 million.  But the costs of bringing that 
action may increase say by between 10 and 100 fold, to between $15,000 and 
$150,000: all of a sudden the economics of suit from the plaintiff’s side start to 
make sense, for the expected recovery exceeds the expected cost of litigation, 
even for claims uncertain in validity and extent.  The situation necessarily works 
a stunning reversal in fortune for the defendant who could be saddled with an 
adverse judgment of $1 million plus his own defense costs.  But without more 
that claim for mercy deserves little sympathy.  The class action only makes 
affordable underlying cases that were already valid.  The real problem was the 
prior inability of injured plaintiffs to counteract the defendant’s wrongful 
conduct. 
                                                                                                                                                 
court orders regarding class certification, and thereby allows parties the opportunity to challenge 
class certification without resorting to the more arduous standards required for mandamus. 
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Yet overcoming that cost barrier introduces management problems of its 
own concerning the relationship of the class to its individual members.  Prior to 
the class action, the initial legal position gives all individuals the sole and 
exclusive ownership of all legal claims, including those for invasion of property, 
personal injuries, fraud or breach of contract. It only makes sense that a cause of 
action for injury to these protected individual interests should ordinarily go to 
the individuals whose interests have been impaired, because they have the best 
information about the issues surrounding the dispute, and they are the ones who 
suffer the unanticipated drop in wealth from the incident. Vesting the claim in 
the initial holder of the right also prevents endless competition over who 
controls the suit, and helps to achieve both deterrence of and compensation for 
injuries, generally regarded as the twin objects of the tort system. 
The initial assignment of the claim to the individual plaintiff may be 
overridden in response to the administrative complications alluded to above.  
The value of the claim depends on the chances for its successful prosecution: 
where the claim is large in amount and unique in content, the individual plaintiff 
will normally be in the best position to decide whether to pursue it.  But once the 
claims become smaller in amount and larger in number, then the presumption 
may have to give way but not absolutely.  One way to understand the class 
action is as a system of forced exchanges whereby the individual plaintiff 
surrenders control of his or her claim in exchange for the benefit of fractional 
class participation of equal or greater value.   
The most obvious applications of this principle do not involve actions for 
damages, but rather cases in which the relief sought is a class good (nonrivalrous 
and nonexclusive) for the members of the class.  Thus when an individual 
shareholder seeks to enjoin or require particular actions from a corporate officer, 
that decision will necessarily impact all shareholders in proportion to their 
interest.  A rule that allows an individual to prosecute only on his own behalf 
thus allows other shareholders to free-ride on that decision.  The class action 
device, insofar as it allows the moving shareholder to recover legal fees 
conditional upon the successful prosecution of the suit, is an effective counter to 
the freerider problems, but does not seem to raise deep concerns about 
individual autonomy given the close alignment of interests between the active 
and the passive shareholders.  And where those conflicts do arise, then some 
method may be reached to allow certain shareholders, with notice, to opt out of 
the class. 
These questions of structural relief are part and parcel of the suits against 
MCOs, many of which claim the need for structural reform of MCO practices for 
the benefit of plan members.  But these cases also seek monetary damages.  Class 
action damage cases do not give rise to the necessary freerider problem that 
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arises in cases seeking injunctive relief.  It is in principle possible for one person 
to pursue his own claim while another individual may decide to settle or 
abandon his suit.  Indeed, it is just that possibility of separability, which allows 
each claimant to pursue independent strategies, which makes the class action 
most controversial in the case of damage actions.68  In this context, the case for 
allowing class actions is necessarily different, and runs as stated above: the 
surrender of the private right to suit is offset by the efforts taken by the class 
representatives and their lawyers on behalf of passive class members, and the 
associated economies of scale which reduce the per claim cost of litigation more 
than enough to offset any costs of amalgamating claims and suppressing their 
differences. That condition is most likely to hold when the class representatives 
have claims typical of members of the class generally, when the lawyers who 
have led the charge are capable of adequately representing both the named and 
the unnamed plaintiffs, and when the common issues in the class are sufficiently 
important and uniform so as to obviate potential conflicts of interests between 
the class representatives and the remaining members of the class.  The ability to 
exit from the class and preserve the individual action is one check on the dangers 
of conflict, and judicial oversight of the various decisions of the class 
representatives and lawyers offers a second line of protection against abuse.  It is 
an open question in principle whether the administrative costs of running the 
class actions—many of which fall on the public at large—are low enough to 
justify the use of the class action mechanism in a given case.  Among other 
things, the system requires some degree of supervision over the attorneys’ fees 
generated under the class action so that the lawyers receive only a competitive 
rate of return on the services that they supply. And there are immense difficulties 
in making sure that the class definition, the actions of the class representative, 
and the decisions concerning whether to litigate or to settle are consistent with 
keeping the passive members of the class better off than they would have been 
had no class action been brought—and better off in roughly uniform proportion 
with the named plaintiffs.  That said, the general view is that the class action 
survives a frontal assault against its very existence, whatever the abuses or errors 
in its application to individual cases.69 
                                                 
68 For recognition of this point, See Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966), 
dealing with amalgamation of damage actions, which states that “[i]n the situations to which this 
subdivision relates, class action treatment is not as clearly called for as in those described above,” 
i.e. in sections 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2). 
69 A convenient summary of the protections is offered in Fleming James, Jr., Geoffrey 
Hazard, Jr., & John Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure §10.22 at 564 (4th ed. 1992)  (footnotes omitted): 
Revised Rule 23 provides for court control of the representative’s conduct, 
including giving notice to absent members of the class, allowing absentees to intervene, 
subdividing the class into subclasses along the lines of their interest, limiting the issues as 
to which the class proceeding shall be binding on absentees, and requiring court approval 
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The Defendant’s Perspective.  As already noted, the class action exposes 
the defendant to liabilities greater than those which it faces in a setting where 
only individual claims (even with permissive joinder) can be brought.  When this 
development follows solely from the consolidation of meritorious claims into a 
single claim with lower aggregate litigation costs, defendants should not be 
heard to complain.  But the formation of the class gives rise to two other 
potential disadvantages for defendants that are not so easily dismissed.   
Substantive Law Transformation Through Claim Amalgamation.  The first 
danger involves the risk of some implicit transformation of the substantive law 
during the course of claim aggregation.  Thus, suppose that the plaintiff must 
prove A, B, and C in order to win an individual judgment.   The class action takes 
on a far more ominous role if the requirement A is dropped, or if the burden of 
proof on element B is switched from what it would be in an individual suit.  Now 
in effect the conservation of legal accountability (as we might call it) is not 
respected in the amalgamation of claims in the class action format, and to that 
imposition the defendant has a legitimate protest. 
Just how powerful these transformations can be is illustrated by the 
successes that plaintiffs had in the tobacco litigation, which proceeded through a 
modified form of the class action.70  The usual tort claim in tobacco litigation 
contained elements for pain and suffering, lost income and medical expenses.  
                                                                                                                                                 
of any settlement.  In addition, members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class —the damages class suit 
— may opt out by signifying that they do not wish to have their claims included in the 
action.  Revised Rule 23 thus appears fully to meet the requirements of Hansberry v. Lee, 
on adequate protection of the absentees’ interests. 
70  See, Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Florida, 678 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 
1996), in which the Florida Supreme Court upheld a statute abrogating “[p]rinciples of common 
law and equity as to assignment, lien subrogation, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, 
and all other affirmative defenses normally available to a liable third party . . . to the extent 
necessary to ensure full recovery by Medicaid from third-party resources. . . .”  Id. at 1244-45 
(quoting Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 251, §4).  With the ordinary tort 
law defenses cast aside by a marriage of legislative fiat and judicial acquiescence, the tobacco 
companies predictably settled, first in Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota, respectively, 
and ultimately in a “global” settlement covering 46 states, 5 U.S. territories, and the District of 
Columbia.  For more on the “global” settlement, see Attorneys General, Tobacco Industry Finalize 
$206 Billion Settlement, Health Law Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1885 (Dec. 3, 1998); for more on the 
Minnesota settlement, see Tobacco Industry Settles Lawsuit with Minnesota, Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield, Health Law Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 779 (May 14, 1998); for more on the Texas settlement, 
see Texas’ $15.3 Billion Settlement with Tobacco Companies is Largest Yet, Health Law Rep. 
(BNA) No. 4, at 125 (Jan. 22, 1998); for more on the Florida settlement, see Tobacco Companies to 
Pay $11.3 Billion to Settle Florida’s Reimbursement Suit, Health Law Rep. (BNA) No. 35 at D-10 
(Aug. 28, 1997); and for more on the Mississippi settlement, see Attorney General Announces $3 
Billion Deal with Tobacco Industry, Health Law Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at D-12 (July 10, 1997).  But 
see State ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa 1998) (finding the State has no 
common law right to indemnity, that it failed to make a subrogation claim, and that it asserted 
claims against tobacco companies as third-party injurers that failed under the remoteness 
doctrine). 
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The ordinary rule of liability required the plaintiff to show some defect in the 
defendant’s product (usually in the warnings supplied), and allowed the 
defendant some version of the assumption of risk defense--in this case the 
continuous awareness of the individual smoker to the risks and hazards of 
smoking--which had proven a powerful defense in these cases.   
But in the Medicaid suits, the medical costs portion of the claim was 
severed from the rest of the basic cause of action and brought by the states in 
their roles as Medicaid suppliers.  This move might have meant that all of these 
medical claims were transferred by subrogation from individual claimants to 
their health care providers.  As a matter of fact, the original Medicaid contracts 
with individual enrollees contained subrogation provisions that required the 
transfer of the medical component of the claims to reimburse Medicaid for its 
statutory expenditures.  Under this subrogation regime, the assignments would 
result in the formation of a quasi-class, subject of course to the individual 
defenses, such as assumption of risk, that could be raised against each individual 
smoker.  Accordingly, Medicaid as subrogee would have been subjected to the 
same merciless dissection of its patients’ personal habits as an individual 
smoker/plaintiff (coupled with a convincing demonstration of the pervasive 
public knowledge of the risks of smoking--knowledge that could not have 
escaped the attention of even the most oblivious of smokers).   
But the Medicaid claims were not treated as subrogation claims, and 
instead becamse “independent” Medicaid claims, which achieved the same class-
like amalgamation without any formal assignment of claims or class actions.71  
And because Medicaid programs themselves are not smokers and in no way 
contributed to their patients’ smoking, they faced no assumption of risk defense 
or the like.  This independent claim was often said to rest on the state’s public 
duty to aid persons in need, but it is hardly clear why it should not be treated the 
same way as any other subrogation claim.  Indeed, if taken seriously, the 
independent claim approach should be available to the insurer in every 
automobile accident or product liability case, so that in each situation the only 
thing that would need to be shown is some defect by the defendant that is said to 
cause harm to the plaintiff.  Yet the rule in question was only applied for the 
benefit of Medicaid, and then only against the tobacco companies—the classic 
case of ad hoc justice.  The transformation of smokers’ claims into headless 
claims for Medicaid reimbursement did exactly what no ordinary device of 
                                                 
71 In Agency for Health Care Admin., the statute at issue allowed the State to recover 
damages for itself on behalf of a group of Medicaid recipients (functionally a class) who allegedly 
suffered injuries from tobacco. While granting Florida the benefit of litigating for its own benefit 
on behalf of a class, it also expressly abrogated the principles of assignment and subrogation and 
the concomitant burden of overcoming affirmative defenses--including assumption of risk.   678 
So.2d at 1244-45.   
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assignment or amalgamation could achieve: it tilted the table in plaintiffs’ 
direction. 
This same strategy—to avoid the affirmative defenses available in a 
subrogation action— was also tried in cases brought by private health plans 
(who are subject to the class action risk in MCO cases).72  The health plans 
claimed that the systematic misrepresentation of the dangers of tobacco fooled 
the health plans (and the plan enrollees) so that both were required to spend 
more in treating tobacco-related illnesses than they would have if they had 
received accurate information about the risks.  One possible way to maintain 
these claims is through subrogation parallel to that of the Medicaid cases, but 
this strategy again created the danger that the individual defenses in each 
individual case had to be litigated—a distinctive element that reduces the 
number of common issues needed for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).  The 
direct action for losses in their own stead avoided these difficulties, but only at 
the cost of introducing other and greater distortions.  The health plans in 
question may not have known (although this is doubtful) of the risks associated 
with smoking, but they did have accurate knowledge of the cost of treatment for 
the populations that they insured.  It is the pool characteristics generally that 
determine the total costs of servicing the assumed risk, and the ultimate question 
is whether the plans received a normal rate of return for their services as a group, 
which in the competitive situation that existed surely seems to be the case.  The 
typical judicial response has denied the cause of action by appealing to a 
notion—privity—that has surely lost its cachet in other contexts.  The 
representations in question were made to smokers, not to the health plans.  But 
the doctrinal head is less important, generally speaking, than the result, which is 
to recognize that the diffusion of information about the risks of smoking were 
sufficiently well known to health plans that they cannot claim any unfair 
surprise.  Indeed the nebulous damages sought—”infrastructure” damages and 
the lost benefits of educational programs (which cost before they can supply any 
benefit)--speak to a cause of action composed of missing links.  For our purpose 
it indicates the same disturbing trend found in the Medicaid suits against the 
tobacco companies--the development of novel theories of liability to circumvent 
the critical proposition of class actions: amalgamation of claims should not lead 
to an expansion of substantive rights. 
Claim Diversification.   The second major difficulty associated with the 
use of class actions is perhaps more subtle but also profound: the loss of 
                                                 
72 See, e.g. Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229 
(2d Cir. 1999).  Subsequent to this decision Judge Weinstein opted for the subrogation approach, 
with all its internal complexities, in National Asbestos Workers Medical Fund v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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diversification in the portfolio of adverse claims.  The defendant that faces a large 
number of individual suits does not face an all-or-nothing risk in actions of this 
sort.  Some cases will win, others lose; and some will settle on the strength of the 
performance of the other cases.  But once all claims are amalgamated, then all 
claims stand or fall at once.  The defendant often faces a risk of financial 
ruination.  Although finance theory may teach that the diversified shareholders 
of public companies ought care little about such risk, CEOs and general counsels 
may behave as though they are quite concerned about the possible demise of the 
company, and may be driven to settlement of cases even if they have doubtful 
merit.  That result can be limited by dividing the large class into smaller ones: 
certain years, certain states, certain products, or whatever.  But even smaller 
classes can be quite large, and the separations may only eliminate the lockstep 
connections, but not the positive correlations.  
To be sure, large groups of similar claims always present certain 
nondiversifiable risks: precedent increases the correlation of outcomes, and at a 
more concrete level the use of offensive collateral estoppel--which has achieved 
some limited adoption--does the same thing by allowing the plaintiff in case B to 
rely on the successful proof of some critical fact in case A.  All of this is done in 
the name of administrative cost control, but with real risks: offensive collateral 
estoppel should not be allowed for the plaintiff who breaks through with success 
after ten prior failures.73  The same attitude should carry over to class actions, 
where broad certifications should be carefully watched to take this risk into 
account. 
B.  Class Actions Against MCOs 
With these preliminaries established, it is worthwhile to look more closely 
at the class actions recently brought against MCOs on behalf of their plan 
participants.  We begin with the standard elements in the complaint.  The 
plaintiffs well understand that they must be able to show the predominance of 
common issues over separate ones in order to obtain class certification.  The first 
maneuver is to disclaim any intention of “seeking to remedy claims of personal 
injury, medical malpractice, and/or wrongful death.”74  Personal injury, medical 
malpractice claims and wrongful death actions all involve particularized proof of 
professional negligence that vary substantially from case to case, and no court 
would ever certify a class with such enormous breadth and such ill-defined 
contours.  A further concern is that the class action attorneys do not wish to start 
                                                 
73  See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Century Home Components, 550 P.2d 1185 (1976) 
(rejecting offensive collateral estoppel where the defendant had succeeded in one previous 
judgment and lost two others).  For a classic treatment of this problem, see Brainerd Currie, 
Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits on the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 289 (1957).  
74 See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint at 6, ¶ 12, Williamson v. Prudential Insurance 
Company of America, No. 2:99CV326 (S.D. Miss. filed Nov. 22, 1999). 
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a class war with ordinary contingent fee lawyers who specialize in medical 
malpractice. 
A strategic retreat, however, does not a lawsuit make.  What then do the 
plaintiffs allege under their common law and RICO and ERISA hats?  The 
answer is a mix of fraud, nondisclosure and breach of contract and fiduciary 
claims, all of which stem from the proposition that the health plans consistently 
promise more than they are able to deliver to their full roster of private 
subscribers.  The number of subscribers tends to be quite large, and thus one 
class action covers nearly four years, from November 1995 to August 1999, and 
includes 6.6 million subscribers nationwide.75   Key allegations read as follows: 
9.  Contrary to Prudential’s false, misleading, and deceptive 
misrepresentations, Prudential during the relevant time herein alleged 
aggressively engaged in implementing covert systematic internal policies 
and practices that resulted in the reduction of the quality of healthcare 
services provided the plaintiff and the class, rather than maintaining and 
improving the quality of their healthcare.  These covert systematic internal 
policies and practices were designed, inter alia, to discourage Prudential’s 
healthcare providers from delivering medical services and intrude with 
the medical judgment of Prudential healthcare providers by substituting 
the judgment of claims reviewers—who had neither the appropriate 
medical training nor the medical specialization to determine the medical 
needs of Prudential enrollees—for the medical judgment of its physicians. 
13.  During the relevant herein alleged, the healthcare services 
provided or made available to the plaintiff, the class, and the subclass 
were worth far less than the health care services described in Prudential’s 
advertising, marketing and member materials.76  
In dealing with allegations of this sort, one District Court had little 
difficulty in dismissing the class complaint by noting that “as a matter of law, it 
is highly doubtful that advertising one’s commitment to ‘quality of care’ can 
serve as the predicate for a fraud claim.  Such general assertions as to quality are 
puffery, and do not constitute a fraudulent inducement to membership in 
defendants’ HMO plans, particularly where the complained-of cost containment 
provisions are disclosed to prospective members.”77 
                                                 
75 “The class consists of individuals who paid premiums or subscription payments, or on 
whose behalf such payments had been made, and were or were named enrollees in any of 
Prudential’s HMOs, PPOs, and POS plans at anytime during the class period from November 22, 
1995 to August 6, 1999.”  Id. at 3, ¶3.  Excluded from the class are Medicare and Medicaid 
members and any director, employee and officer of the defendant. 
76   Id. at 5-6.  
77 Maio v. Aetna Inc., No. CIV.A. 99-1969, 1999 WL 800315, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1999). 
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This line of argument is as valid against a single action brought by one 
MCO enrollee as by an entire class, and does not address the question of whether 
class action status should be applied to this case if the substantive deficiencies in 
the claim were somehow overcome.  In this regard, it is useful to distinguish the 
fraud from the breach of contract portions of the argument.   
The basic law of class actions has long made it clear that suits for fraud are 
possible, but fragile candidates for class action status: “although having some 
common core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if 
there was material variation in the representations made or in the kinds or 
degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were addressed.”78   
Thus, the nature and source of the defendant’s representations in question 
must be examined carefully.  The plaintiffs duly allege that all the defendant’s 
representations in question were “standardized and uniform” because they came 
through the usual set of “marketing materials, including certificates of coverage, 
member handbooks, member information, provider directories, and other 
documents.”79  Unfortunately, this mode of pleading operates as a clear slight-of-
hand.  The complaint sets out no particulars whatsoever, itself a problem given 
the somewhat puzzling Federal Rules requirement that fraud be pleaded “with 
particularity.”80  But even if one did catalogue all the communications in these 
various categories, that proof would provide no reason to believe that each 
subscriber read and relied on the same set of materials.  The case is not like a 
typical securities case where the defendants have issued a single prospectus that 
was read and relied upon by all.  Different programs had different standardized 
materials; and even two individuals who were part of the same plan need not 
have read the same information at the same time.  These standardized materials 
are not, moreover, the only source of communications: oral communications with 
physicians, nurses and plan personnel certainly help shape the responses of 
different individuals.  These deviations from standard norms were used to 
                                                 
78 Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966).  For cases that have denied class 
certification in fraud/RICO contexts, see Martin v. Dahlberg, Inc., 156 F.R.D. 207 (N.D. Cal. 1994).  
In Martin, the court analyzed alleged misrepresentations by manufacturers, retailers, franchisees 
and hearing consultants on the sale of hearing aids and found “[t]he diversity of sources of 
information, the diversity of messages generated by those interested in selling Dahlberg products, 
and the potential for differing reliance on varied information weigh strongly against class 
adjudication of the critical issue of reliance.”  Id. at 215.  See also, Rodriguez v McKinney, 156 
F.R.D. 112 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (rejecting fraud/RICO cases for insufficient benefits given to students 
without high school diplomas who attended trade schools, noting the difficulties on the reliance 
question, both from affirmative misrepresentations and nondisclosures).  
79 Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint at 4, ¶¶4-5. 
80  Fed R. Civ. P. 9(b) states: “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”  
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undercut the adequacy of written warnings in drug and vaccine cases,81 and 
those differences should not be ignored here.  Add to these structural features 
the observation that many of the negotiations for plan membership were made 
by informed intermediaries (e.g. employers, unions, churches, fraternal 
organizations) and the like, and it seems as though the issue of what counts as 
fraud, and what counts as reliance will differ substantially.  One possible 
response is to break down the single class of 6.6 million into subclasses, so that 
all persons who were enrolled in HMOs, for example, could be treated separately 
from those who were enrolled in PPOs and POS plans.  But even this move 
conceals the differences that might arise when individuals join plans at different 
times, or are subject to somewhat different disclosure requirements as mandated 
under different systems of state law. 
Another way to skirt these difficulties is to hold the plans responsible for 
what they did not disclose rather than what they said.  The argument here is that 
silence is uniform across different audiences even if speech is not.  But the 
counterarguments seem more cogent here as well.  Initially, the content of the 
required disclosures depends in part on the types of coverage being offered and 
in part on the nature of the target audience, and these will vary from case to case.  
In addition, the impact of the nondisclosures will at a minimum depend on both 
what else has been said, and on what statutory obligations to disclose can be 
found under local law.  In the end, therefore, the same class action fate ought to 
await the nondisclosure claims as the misrepresentation claims.  They do not 
present the single decisive moment that allows for class amalgamation. 
The next question is whether the outcome differs when the issue switches 
from misrepresentation to breach of contract, as suggested in paragraph 13 set 
out above.  The answer is clearly “no”: to figure out whether individuals have 
been short-changed in the delivery of health care services, someone has to decide 
just how much health care was given to what individuals.  None of the actions 
contemplate such analysis with respect to individual class members.  The theory 
has to be that on average all individuals received care inferior to what was 
promised them at the outset so that relief comes in one of two forms: either a 
comprehensive refund to every class member, or some form of prospective 
structural relief for the benefit of all class members.  These forms of relief raise 
serious questions, both for the question of class certification and for the 
soundness of the underlying complaint. 
                                                 
81 See, e.g, Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971) (finding the written warnings of the 
dangers of chloromycetin were insufficient in light of overpromotion by Parke, Davis’ detail 
man); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding liability in part 
based upon the lack of individual representations by nurses administering vaccines). 
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The implications of the nonperformance allegations from paragraph 13 of 
the basic class action complaint are made clearer when those allegations are 
juxtaposed against the rhetoric that accompanies it:  “Aetna is one of the most 
reprehensible companies in this respect. . . .  It’s been fairly aggressive about 
pursuing a policy of cost-containment with its doctors.”82  These statements leave 
it unclear whether the claim for loss of the benefit of bargain works in the 
interests of any, let alone all members of the putative class.  It is easy enough to 
assume that refunds to all class members might be desirable for past periods, at 
least if they do not cripple the ability of the firm to operate as before in future 
periods.  But it is far from clear that the class members share a common interest 
in the nature and quality of services that they wish to receive from MCO 
organizations.  The plaintiffs in effect claim that there is a particular standard of 
care is required from the defendant across a range of its health plans, but the 
complaint offers no evidence whatsoever that the standard of care that it 
stipulates as desirable is in fact optimal for all members of the group given their 
different financial constraints and consumer preferences.  It could well be that 
the class action would, if allowed to go forward, set the standard of care such 
that in the mandated equilibrium large numbers of potential enrollees drop out, 
which in turn could increase the costs on the shrunken group that now remains. 
The problem of organizing a class action becomes more acute when it is noted 
that some members of the class may suffer from preexisting conditions, with the 
special problems that it entails, while others do not. The thought that one should 
supply uniform care levels to all participants of all plans makes none of the 
quality differentiation by income and taste that is characteristic of markets.  This 
observation should be more than sufficient for the conclusion that the class action 
is an inappropriate vehicle for imposing either minimum or uniform standards 
on the health care industry. 
Likewise, the hallmark of managed care is cost-containment, and its 
proliferation suggests that many consumers desire it ex ante, even if it is reviled 
ex post by the fraction of individuals to whom it is applied.  To take the position 
that all such efforts are misguided, or even that cost containment must be done in 
certain judicially prescribed ways, is not a proper fix for the MCO, but its death 
knell.  There can be all sorts of mechanisms for controlling costs: the trade-off 
between increased (or earlier) access and cost is hardly straightforward.  The one 
wrong approach would be to suppose that a trial court judge knows best what 
mechanism to decree.  
                                                 
82 Jennifer M. Gangloff, “Repair Team” Hits Aetna with Another Class Action Lawsuit (last 
modified Nov. 1, 1999) <http://www.insure.com/health/aetnasuit1199.html>.  REPAIR stands 
for RICO and ERISA Prosecutors Advocating for Insurance industry Reform. 
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Finally, some note must be made of the relationship between these suits 
alleging lost benefits in quality of care and the availability of individual 
malpractice actions.  As noted earlier, the class action complaint carves out from 
consideration all malpractice actions and remits them to the tort system.  But the 
consequence of supplying insufficient medical benefits to patients in relation to 
what was promised may often be actionable malpractice as well.  If a court 
chooses to order a refund under these umbrella contract claims plaintiffs may in 
effect receive double compensation for at least those mistakes in treatment that 
are caught by the medical malpractice system  
As a concluding caution, while we oppose many of the substantive 
provisions of the various so-called patients’ bills of rights, we think that the 
merits of managed care regulation are better resolved in the legislative arena. 
Regulatory proposals have been the source of contentious debates in Congress 
and the states, and it is dangerous to assume that the democratic process has in 
some sense failed because these proposals have not always been enacted into 
law.  Both sides have a fair crack at success, and each is armed with ample funds 
to pursue its object in the political arena.  A political defeat should not be 
regarded as a miscarriage of justice to be remedied by other means, often judicial 
in character.  Rather, the central question should be the level at which legislative 
reforms, if any, should be introduced.  If single, comprehensive national reforms 
are required, then federal legislation becomes the appropriate vehicle of reform.  
If matters are properly resolved differently by different states, then statewide 
legislation seems to be appropriate.  Our instinct is that a period of experimental 
reform at the state level certainly makes sense before any blanket policy is 
mandated nationally.  But in any event, everyone should have some rights of 
participation on matters of this importance, not just the parties to a particular 
lawsuit.  The class action is simply not a suitable vehicle for any system-wide 
reform of the health care delivery system. 
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